War Risk are only the Beginning
War Risk are only the Beginning
Published by pacificusnautical.com
War Risk Premiums Are Only the Beginning
How Geopolitical Disruption Is Repricing Risk, Freight and Tonnage
When the war between the United States and Iran began on 28 February 2026, one of the world's busiest energy chokepoints effectively closed. Clarksons Research counted Strait of Hormuz transits at around four a day in the week to 23 March, against roughly 125 a day before the conflict, with about 1,100 vessels caught inside the Gulf. [1] As at 9 October 2026, the IMO reported 100 confirmed incidents and 24 seafarer fatalities. [2]
The first headline was the price of war risk cover. The more important story for anyone fixing, financing or moving cargo is that geopolitical exposure has become a pricing variable in its own right. It is repricing four things at once: the cost of insuring a voyage, who bears that cost under the contract, which tonnage is available where, and how employable and valuable a ship looks to the next charterer or buyer.
Our view: the market no longer prices ships on size, age and efficiency alone. It prices where they can trade, on what terms, and who carries the risk when the map changes.
Standard hull policies exclude war, so vessels entering areas listed by the Joint War Committee at Lloyd's need cover bought back through an additional premium (AP), quoted as a percentage of hull value. [3] Before the war, cover for a VLCC cost about 0.25% of hull value. On 22 July, S&P Global reported that rates for Hormuz transits were 7.5% to 10%, depending on the concerns of the day. [5] It also reported that underwriters were increasingly reluctant to quote spot terms. [5] For a $100 million tanker, 7.5–10% means $7.5–10 million for a transit, against about $250,000 before the war. [3][5] Quotes vary by date, source and vessel, so any figure needs a date attached.
The constraint is no longer only price. Cover is short-dated, re-priced often, and sometimes simply not offered on the terms a fixture assumed.
What this means commercially
• Owners: the premium scales with hull value, so newer and more expensive tonnage carries the heavier bill for the same transit. Whether a ship goes depends on who pays.
• Charterers: a voyage estimate built on one quote can be out of date within days. Every TCE comparison needs a dated premium assumption.
• Brokers: Gulf-exposed fixtures need the premium assumption, its validity window and a re-pricing mechanism written into the terms, rather than a single number agreed at fixing.
• Vessel values and employment: a ship that cannot obtain cover on workable terms cannot trade the affected area, and its earning pool shrinks accordingly. Hull value also determines how costly each transit is, so the owner's economics differ ship by ship.
Most charters carry a version of BIMCO's CONWARTIME (time) or VOYWAR (voyage) clause, in its 2013 or 2025 form. Under both, owners may refuse to go to or through an area where the master or owners reasonably judge the ship, crew or cargo may be exposed to war risks, even if the risk arose after the fixture. [6]
On voyage charters, VOYWAR 2025 ties adjusted freight for a diversion to the time and expenses incurred or saved, as documented by owners. [6] On time charters, the 2013 wording makes charterers reimburse the additional premiums owners' insurers require, while the 2025 revision gives charterers greater rights to ask for evidence of owners' efforts to obtain terms. Steamship Mutual cautions that paying the additional premium does not by itself protect charterers from an owners' claim if the charterparty has been breached. [7] Hill Dickinson advises owners to record their reasoning and keep evidence of reasonable efforts to obtain cover. [8]
Disputes are already forming. Poonam Melwani KC lists open questions including whether additional premiums are recoverable under CONWARTIME and VOYWAR, and whether an owner can refuse to sign bills of lading where the discharge port needs a Hormuz transit. [9]
What this means commercially
• Owners: keep a documented record of the risk assessment and of efforts to obtain cover. It is the basis for recovering premium and for defending a refusal.
• Charterers: paying the premium is not a safe harbour if the underlying charter has been breached. Ask for evidence of owners' efforts, particularly under the 2025 wording.
• Brokers: the war clause is now a live negotiating point, not boilerplate. Before the next fixture, settle whether AP is for charterers' account and on what evidence, how a change of discharge port is exercised, and which version of the clause governs.
• Vessel values and employment: clause wording determines how freely a ship can be employed in disrupted trades. Ships on well-drafted terms are easier to fix, and a buyer will price the difference.
Liner carriers moved within days. Hapag-Lloyd introduced a war risk surcharge on 2 March of $1,500 per TEU, or $3,500 per reefer or special container, on cargo to and from the Gulf, payable by the booking party and also applying to cargo already on the water. [10]
Rerouting turns a cost problem into a capacity problem. On 1 September, Seatrade reported that Cape diversions were still absorbing 5–7% of global container capacity, or 1.7 to 2.4 million TEU. [11] Clarksons Research recorded Bab el Mandeb transits down 30% on the second-quarter average in tonnage terms at the end of July, with VLCC crossings down 70%. [12] Longer voyages also mean more bunker consumption, the highest cost on a longer route that owners and charterers cannot recover from anyone else.
What this means commercially
• Owners: diversion removes effective tonnage from the market, which supports earnings for ships that can still trade the long route. The open question is who pays for the extra days and fuel.
• Charterers: longer voyages and surcharges feed straight into delivered cost, and time charterers carry the fuel. Cargo interests on fixed-price delivered contracts absorb the gap between what they quoted and what carriers now charge. Where margins are thin, rising freight becomes a credit problem.
• Brokers: route, distance and surcharge pass-through need to be explicit in voyage fixtures and contracts of affreightment.
• Vessel values and employment: ships able to take the long way round are in demand while diversions last. That support is tied to the disruption, so buyers should be careful about capitalising it into long-term value.
Not everyone is paying. Disruption on this scale lifts tonne-miles and rates for the right ships. At the two-month mark, Lloyd's List reported VLCC rates settled around $100,000 a day. [13] Product tanker rates hit all-time highs in April, including Med–Asia LR2 at $122,267 a day. [14] Longer West-to-East voyages lifted VLCC tonne-miles about 9% above the previous year in the second quarter, offsetting fewer cargoes. [15] The upside is not guaranteed: OPEC cut its 2026 oil-demand growth forecast from 1.4 million b/d to 400,000 b/d, a slowdown that raises a demand-destruction risk for VLCCs. [16]
Whether a ship can capture that upside depends on a chain of consents: underwriters willing to quote, owners willing to pay, charter wording that allocates the cost, and a crew contractually free to go. The International Bargaining Forum designated the Strait of Hormuz a warlike operations area on 5 March. For ships under IBF agreements, seafarers in the area receive double pay and may refuse to sail there and request repatriation at the company's expense. [17] The IMO's position is that there is no safe transit anywhere in the strait. [18]
Where that chain holds, a ship has trading flexibility. Where any link breaks, employment narrows. In sale and purchase terms, we think this matters in three ways:
• Employment prospects: a ship whose cover, crew terms and charter wording allow it to trade disrupted routes can command a premium there. A ship restricted by any one link competes for a narrower pool of cargoes.
• Buyer due diligence: buyers should weigh trading history in listed areas, war risk cover terms and any history of declined or restricted cover, crew agreements, and the clause wording on existing employment, alongside age, specification and efficiency.
• Attractiveness at sale: sellers who can evidence these points will have an easier conversation and a broader buyer pool. Those who cannot should expect questions, and potentially a discount for uncertainty.
This is a demonstrative analysis rather than a measured price effect. We would expect it to show first in the ships most exposed to the affected trades, and to matter most where a buyer is underwriting the next employment, not the last.
What this means commercially
• Owners: treat trading flexibility as an asset to be documented and protected. Keep cover history, crew agreement status and clause positions in a form a buyer or financier can review.
• Charterers: the ships able to trade disrupted routes carry a premium. Decide early whether that is worth paying for the cargo in question.
• Brokers: trading limits, war clause wording and premium allocation increasingly move fixture terms and hire, so they belong in the negotiation, not the small print.
• Vessel values and employment: earnings from disruption are strongest, and least durable, for ships positioned to exploit it. Value work should separate disruption-driven income from earnings that persist once the risk fades.
The market will keep pricing geopolitical exposure for as long as participants doubt the risk has genuinely gone. July commentary was that rates were unlikely to fall until the market believes the risk environment has changed. [19] The scenarios below are Pacificus analysis, not forecasts.
1. Durable reopening
Market impact: premiums ease, but lag the politics, because underwriters want evidence rather than announcements. [19] A rush of cargoes could briefly tighten Gulf tonnage and lift rates. [15] As the long West-to-East voyages shorten, weak demand matters more. [15][16]
Commercial consequence: strong short-term fixing, then softer VLCC earnings. Owners should avoid over-reading the spike when valuing or selling.
2. Prolonged stalemate with intermittent attacks
Market impact: cover stays volatile, and spot terms stay hard to obtain. [5] Cape diversions persist, container capacity stays absorbed, and surcharges stay in place. [11] Tonne-miles stay supported, but earnings swing with each incident.
Commercial consequence: clause disputes become more likely. [9] Ships with documented cover and clean clause positions hold an advantage in fixing and in sale.
3. Escalation, particularly around Bab el Mandeb
Market impact: with VLCC crossings of Bab el Mandeb already down 70% [12] and Cape diversions absorbing 5–7% of container capacity [11], a wider closure would remove more effective tonnage from a stretched market and push freight and surcharges higher.
Commercial consequence: owners become more likely to invoke their right to refuse orders. [6] Employment for restricted ships narrows sharply, and the gap between flexible and inflexible tonnage widens.
War risk premiums attract the headlines, but the commercial takeaway is about who can still trade, and on what terms. Cover, contract wording and crew entitlements are no longer back-office detail. Together they decide which ships can take the work, who carries the cost, and what a buyer will pay for the ship.
Our advice is practical. Put geopolitical exposure on the face of every voyage estimate, charterparty and valuation, with each figure dated. Treat evidence of trading flexibility (cover history, clause positions, crew terms) as part of a ship's record, because the next charterer, financier and buyer will ask for it. In this market, the numbers change faster than the contracts, and the party with the better-drafted contract and the better-documented ship will be the one that benefits.
[1] Argus Media, Hormuz transits remain 95pc down: Clarksons, 24 March 2026. https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2805033-hormuz-transits-remain-95pc-down-clarksons
[2] International Maritime Organization, Middle East — highlighted incidents, figures as at 9 October 2026. https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/middle-east-highlighted-incidents.aspx
[3] Nautilus Shipping, War Risk Insurance in 2026: What Ship Owners Need to Know, 2026. https://www.nautilusshipping.com/news-and-insights/war-risk-insurance-in-2026-what-ship-owners-need-to-know
[4] The National, Shipping insurance surges again as attacks intensify over Strait of Hormuz, 17 July 2026. https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/2026/07/17/war-risk-shipping-premium-surges-again-as-tensions-escalate-at-strait-of-hormuz/
[5] S&P Global Energy (Platts), Middle East shipping insurance costs rise on Hormuz risks: Marsh, 22 July 2026. https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/072226-middle-east-shipping-insurance-costs-rise-on-hormuz-risks-marsh
[6] Skuld, US and Iranian tensions: Charterparty implications, 2025–26. https://www.skuld.com/topics/legal/pi-and-defence/us-and-iranian-tensions-charterparty-implications/
[7] Steamship Mutual, Transiting the Strait of Hormuz: War Risk, Unsafe Port and Frustration, June 2025. https://www.steamshipmutual.com/jp/node/73396
[8] Baltic Exchange (Baltic Magazine), Navigating a de facto closure (legal commentary by Hill Dickinson), 2026. https://www.balticexchange.com/en/news-and-events/news/baltic-magazine/2026/Navigating-a-de-facto-closure.html
[9] Poonam Melwani KC, via Mondaq, The Iran War: So Many Questions, 2026. https://www.mondaq.com/the-iran-war-so-many-questions-poonam-melwani-kc/1761054
[10] Hapag-Lloyd (via Datamar News), Hapag-Lloyd applies War Risk Surcharge on shipments to and from the Upper Gulf, Arabian Gulf and Persian Gulf, 2 March 2026. https://datamarnews.com/?p=68109
[11] Seatrade Maritime, Container lines edge towards full Suez and Red Sea return, 1 September 2026. https://seatrade-maritime.com/containers/container-lines-edge-towards-full-suez-and-red-sea-return
[12] Clarksons Research, World Fleet Register: shipping market briefings, Q3 2026, 2026. https://www.clarksons.net/WFR/
[13] Lloyd's List, Hormuz crisis at two months: a tale of four shipping markets, 30 April 2026. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1157052/Hormuz-crisis-at-two-months-a-tale-of-four-shipping-markets
[14] Lloyd's List, US blockade of Hormuz will steer more tankers toward Atlantic, 13 April 2026. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156892/US-blockade-of-Hormuz-will-steer-more-tankers-toward-Atlantic
[15] Tankers International, ‘VLCC Freight Market – Q2 2026 in Review’, republished by Seatrade Maritime, 30 June 2026. https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/tankers/vlcc-freight-market-q2-2026-in-review
[16] Reuters, OPEC cuts 2026 oil demand growth forecast to 400,000 b/d, 12 October 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/opec-cuts-2026-oil-demand-growth-forecast-400000-bpd-sees-pent-up-demand-2027-2026-10-12/
[17] AFP (via Al-Ahram), Shipping employers and unions still consider Hormuz a war zone, 1 July 2026. https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/572043.aspx
[18] Maritime Africa (reporting the IMO Secretary-General), No safe transit through Strait of Hormuz, 2026. https://maritimafrica.com/en/no-safe-transit-through-strait-of-hormuz-imo-secretary-general/
[19] Insurance Business, Hormuz war-risk rates surge again as ceasefire collapses, July 2026. https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/hormuz-warrisk-rates-surge-again-as-ceasefire-collapses-581988.aspx