Published by pacificusnautical.com

September 2026

Nigeria's Container Shipping Market: Growth Amid Congestion, and the Cargo-Reservation Question

Nigeria's container trade is expanding faster than its ports can comfortably absorb. Export volumes nearly doubled in the first quarter of 2026, over $1 billion in new terminal capacity is under construction at Lagos, and Nigeria's first indigenous container vessel has entered service. Yet exporters are reporting some of the worst congestion in years, and long-standing questions about cargo reservation for Nigerian carriers are resurfacing. For shipping lines, charterers and cargo owners active in West Africa, the next 18–24 months will be shaped by how these pressures resolve.

Infrastructure: Snake Island and Lekki

The centrepiece of Lagos's expansion is the Snake Island container terminal, where Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) signed a 45-year sub-concession with Nigerdock in March 2026[1]. The project an 85-hectare, three-terminal concession with 2.5km of combined quay carries a total private investment projected above $1.85 billion, structured as an initial $1 billion outlay plus $850 million in reinvestment over the life of the concession; the Nigerian Ports Authority expects to earn over $5.2 billion in revenue across the 45 years[2]. At 18 metres, the terminal's draft is designed for ultra-large container vessels, reducing reliance on transhipment through other regional ports for mainline calls[1]. Completion is targeted for 2028.

In the interim, MSC has moved to give Nigerian shippers earlier access to its global network: in August 2026 it launched a weekly feeder connecting Lekki Port (16.5m draft) to its services via Lomé, Togo, opening scheduled links to European, Asian and trans-Atlantic markets[3].

Nigeria's non-oil export drive is gaining real traction. Export value reached $925.84 million in Q1 2026, up 38.68% year-on-year, while export container throughput nearly doubled to 19,014 TEU[4]. But growth has outpaced the system's ability to move cargo out. By July 2026, roughly 1,800 export containers sat at APM Terminals in Lagos, with around 1,000 still unshipped some since late 2025 prompting the Nigerian Shippers' Council to intervene directly with carriers over delays and compensation for perishable losses[5].

Exporter associations describe a familiar cycle: vessels scheduled to lift Nigerian export cargo divert instead to Cotonou, Abidjan or Tema to load, bypassing local exporters, while empty-container availability in Lagos remains inadequate for booked volumes[6]. The Association of West African Exporters and Maritime Professionals puts the export sector's value at risk at roughly $44 billion, and has linked part of the disruption to carriers curtailing Middle East-linked routes amid regional tensions[7]. Terminal operators are responding: APM Terminals Apapa has pledged 24-hour barge operations and 60% rail-based evacuation of export boxes from Q4 2026[8].

Cargo Reservation and NIMASA Act Section 37

Nigeria already has a cargo-reservation framework on its books it is simply not being used. Section 37 of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) Act 2007 grants ‘national carriers’ a right to at least 50% of Nigeria's bulk dry and liquid cargo, extends the same 50% principle to other cargo moving outside liner-conference arrangements, and reserves at least 50% of cargo generated through technical assistance or international aid for Nigerian-flagged vessels[9]. Section 36 goes further, giving national carriers exclusive rights to carry import and export cargo belonging to Federal, State and Local Governments and their agencies[9].

The catch is qualification. Under Section 35, ‘national carrier’ status requires at least 60% Nigerian ownership, a Nigerian head office and management, at least one ocean-going vessel of 5,000 net registered tonnage or more, and a crew that is at least 75% Nigerian, including the master and chief officer[9]. In practice, no Nigerian-owned operator currently meets this bar in the deep-sea trades Section 37 targets, and NIMASA's own leadership has acknowledged that weak enforcement of both the NIMASA Act and the 2003 Cabotage Act has left Nigeria without an indigenous carrier moving any share of the country's crude or refined product imports and exports[10]. The Agency has called for fresh capital investment and stronger enforcement to revive a national carrier able to use the reservation Section 37 already provides[10]. Until that capacity exists, the 50% cargo-support right remains a stated policy rather than an operating reality but it is a live lever Abuja could revisit as local tonnage grows, including from new entrants such as Clarion Shipping's MV Ocean Dragon, Nigeria's first indigenous-owned container vessel, now serving coastal and short-sea routes[11].

The Shipping Lines' Perspective

Carriers are not simply avoiding Nigeria commercially, Lagos remains the anchor market in the Gulf of Guinea. But the operational case for routing tonnage through Cotonou, Tema or Abidjan first is real. Terminal yards in Lagos have been running at high utilisation, and diverting a vessel to load export boxes already available elsewhere in the region is, from a scheduling standpoint, often more reliable than holding a slot for containers still moving through congested Lagos gates. The Shippers' Council's mid-2026 engagement with Maersk Nigeria illustrates the dynamic: of roughly 1,800 export boxes reported awaiting shipment, the carrier had already evacuated 800 before the remaining 1,000 became a formal complaint[5]. Separately, exporter groups have named MSC, CMA CGM, COSCO, ONE and Maersk among lines restricting empty-container release into Nigeria while repositioning equipment through neighbouring ports instead[6].

Carriers, for their part, point to constrained yard space, equipment cycle times, and through 2026 Middle East-linked route disruptions as compounding factors on an already tight network[7]. Read together, the pattern looks less like a boycott than a coordination problem: lines are optimising vessel and container utilisation across a regional network in which Lagos is currently the most congested, not the least attractive, node.

What's Happening in Lomé and Tema

Nigeria's neighbours are not standing still. The Port of Lomé has completed a dredging programme deepening its access channel to 18.6 metres, enabling calls from vessels of up to 24,000 TEU, as part of a wider upgrade programme running to 2027[12]. Togolese officials continue to position Lomé already West Africa's busiest transhipment hub as the region's logistics hub of choice, citing its ranking among Africa's top ports for transit traffic and container throughput[13].

Tema has just completed Phases I and II of a roughly $1.5 billion expansion led by Meridian Port Services (a joint venture of APM Terminals, Africa Global Logistics and the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority), lifting capacity toward 3–3.7 million TEU a year via new berths, a 1,400-metre quay and a fresh fleet of electric gantry cranes[14][15]. MPS reports 22% cargo-volume growth in Q1 2026 alone and cites improved connectivity to Lagos, Cotonou, Lomé, Dakar and Abidjan as opening new regional trade corridors[15]. For Nigerian cargo interests, this means credible, well-capitalised alternatives now sit within days' sailing of Lagos reinforcing the commercial logic carriers already apply when congestion bites.

What Other Jurisdictions Suggest

Nigeria's cargo-reservation ambitions are far from unique, and other emerging markets offer a genuine before-and-after comparison. Indonesia's 2008 Maritime Law required domestic sea transport to run on Indonesian-flagged, Indonesian-crewed vessels; within seven years the national fleet had more than doubled, from roughly 6,000 to over 12,500 vessels, with gross tonnage up more than 300%[16]. The contrast with Nigeria's experience is enforcement and sequencing: Indonesia paired its reservation rule with financing support and a phased timeline, and then applied it consistently.

That said, cargo reservation is not costless. When Indonesia later extended cabotage into offshore oil-and-gas support shipping, the International Chamber of Shipping warned that reservation policies can raise shipping costs, reduce competition, sit uneasily with WTO commitments, and dampen investor confidence if implemented without adequate domestic tonnage to absorb the reserved cargo[17]. That is precisely the risk facing Nigeria today: activating Section 37's 50% cargo-support right before an indigenous fleet exists to carry it would either strand cargo or force a cycle of waivers that defeats the policy's purpose. The more durable path visible in Indonesia's later years, and in Ghana's and Togo's terminal-investment models pairs any reservation policy with capital access, phased implementation, and infrastructure genuinely able to handle the reserved trade.

Conclusion 

For shipping lines and cargo owners, the operating picture in Nigeria over the next two years runs on parallel tracks: real capacity coming on stream at Snake Island and Lekki; genuine near-term congestion and export bottlenecks; an unused but legally live cargo-reservation framework under Section 37; and increasingly capable regional alternatives at Lomé and Tema. Shippers booking Nigerian export cargo should build in longer lead times, monitor empty-container availability closely, and treat Cotonou, Lomé and Tema routings as standing contingencies rather than emergency measures. Carriers and terminal operators have both a commercial and a regulatory incentive to invest in evacuation capacity now Nigeria's underlying export growth is real, and the market that solves its congestion problem first stands to capture a disproportionate share of West Africa's next trade cycle.

References

[1]  Maritime Executive (2026) 'MSC to Develop Container Terminal at Snake Island, Nigeria', March.

[2]  Adeodun, D. (2026) 'Billionaire Maher Jarmakani's Lagos port lands $1 billion from the world's biggest shipping line', Billionaires.Africa, 11 August. Available at: https://www.billionaires.africa/2026/08/11/nigerian-tycoon-maher-jarmakanis-lagos-port-lands-1-billion-from-the-worlds-biggest-shipping-line/

[3]  Vanguard (2026) 'MSC Launches Weekly Service to Lekki Port', August.

[4]  Shipping Position (2026) 'Exports Surge By 38.66% to $925.84m in Q1 2026 As Operators Lament Congestion, Vessel Shortage', 18 May. Available at: https://shippingposition.com.ng/exports-surge-by-38-66-to-925-84m-in-q1-2026-as-operators-lament-congestion-vessel-shortage/

[5]  Guardian (2026) '1,000 export containers trapped at Lagos port over vessel shortages, congestion', 8 July. Available at: https://guardian.ng/business-services/1000-export-containers-trapped-at-lagos-port-over-vessel-shortages-congestion/

[6]  Nigerian Shippers' Council (2026) 'Nigerian Shippers' Council Intervention Secures Container Commitments Following AWAEMAP Complaints'. Available at: https://shipperscouncil.gov.ng/?p=7777

[7]  Legit.ng (2026) 'Container Scarcity at Nigerian Ports Threatens Country's $44bn Export Sector', 23 March. Available at: https://www.legit.ng/business-economy/maritime/1702329-container-scarcity-nigerian-ports-threatens-countrys-44bn-export-sector/

[8]  Leadership (2026) 'Port Operator Tackles Export Bottlenecks, Targets 24-Hour Barge, 60% Rail Evacuation', September. Available at: https://leadership.ng/port-operator-tackles-export-bottlenecks-targets-24-hour-barge-60-rail-evacuation/

[9]  Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007) Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act, No. 17, ss. 35–39. Available at: https://nimasa.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/NG_Nigerian_Maritime_Admin_Act_2007.pdf

[10]  Guardian (n.d.) 'NIMASA seeks capital investment, law enforcement to revive national carrier'. Available at: https://guardian.ng/business-services/business/nimasa-seeks-capital-investment-law-enforcement-to-revive-national-carrier/

[11]  AllAfrica / Vanguard (2025) 'Nigeria: First Nigerian Owned Container Vessel Arrives Lagos', 3 July. Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/202507030138.html

[12]  Ecofin Agency (2025) 'Togo's Lomé Port Completes Upgrade for Mega-Ships in Gulf of Guinea Rivalry', 25 September.

[13]  AllAfrica (2026) 'Togo: Un leadership régional consolidé malgré la concurrence', 11 January. Available at: https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/202601120166.html

[14]  Ecofin Agency (2026) 'Ghana Expands Tema Port Capacity With New Cargo Equipment', 9 April. Available at: https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-infrastructures/0904-54543-ghana-expands-tema-port-capacity-with-new-cargo-equipment

[15]  Meridian Port Services (2026) 'MPS Expects Next-Gen Equipment Fleet to Power Expansion to 3 Million TEUs', March. Available at: https://mps-gh.com/?p=18540

[16]  Jakarta Post (2013) 'Cabotage provides a big boost shipping industry', 23 September. Available at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/23/cabotage-provides-a-big-boost-shipping-industry

[17]  Seatrade Maritime (n.d.) 'ICS responds to Indonesia cabotage decree'. Available at: https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/dry-bulk/ics-responds-to-indonesia-cabotage-decree